The paper focuses on two exponentiations, operated consecutively in two different finite primitive fields with characteristic two. The result of the first field creates in the second field a large number, practically infinite, of encryption algorithms and the only one possibility is the brute force cryptanalysis. In the appendix is attached double simulation of the Secure Encryption Device algorithm for encryption and decryption of 127 bits.
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Conjecture of two finite fields
A conjecture is an assertion for which we do not know its proof yet, but it is suspected to be true, in the absence of cons-example. Suppose two different finite n bits (n states for Mersenne number), made and operated like a linear feedback shift register (LFSR, see [1] for details). The characteristic polynomials are primitive (see [4] ) and thus the length of the sequence of consecutive powers of discrete logarithms is equal to 2 n -1.
The characteristic polynomial may be represented by the sum of the powers P n , for example P 0 + P 1 + P 2 + P 3 = P 7 for n = 7.
The nonzero-power components of the characteristic polynomial express the numbers of bits from which the feedback loops. By convention, a discrete logarithm has the value 0 for the vector with all bits equal to 1. Each n-bits vector is an element of the finite field. This vector has one and only one discrete logarithm and every discrete logarithm corresponds with one and only one vector. The exponentiation of an input vector to the power K gives, as a result, the vector having discrete logarithm as the product of the logarithm of the input vector multiplied by K modulo 2 n -1.
Any exponentiation of a vector belonging to the first finite field, raised to the power secret K gives first result, which vector, placed in the second finite field and raised to the same power, gives the encryption result. Knowing the input and output vector of the created encryption algorithm, the statement says that the secret exponent K can only be recalculated by an opponent making exhaustive search of 2 n -1 possible exponents. It seems to be possible, because the structures of the two finite fields are similar, discrete logarithms and encrypted data will be linked by a function to recalculate the key K. In fact, when the same vector from first finite field is in the second finite field, discrete logarithms are modified according to a bijection of size 2 n -1 and it gives the correspondence between the two discrete logarithms in finite fields. Let Ve be an input vector whose discrete logarithm is equal to lgd(Ve). During the operations of encryption, discrete logarithms are modified according to the following relationships Ve → lgd(Ve), lgd(Ve) → K * lgd(Ve), K * lgd(Ve) → bijection (K * lgd(Ve)), bijection (K * lgd(Ve)) → K * bijection (K * lgd(Ve)). The last term has the discrete logarithm vector encrypted in the second finite fields. The value of the bijection (bijection (K * lgdVe))) is a function of K. There are 2 n -1 possible values of K and therefore as many stated values for the bijection. We find here an exhaustive search of level 2 n -1, i. e. brute force.
Conjecture of two finite fields and its applications
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The first step towards the realization of a finite field of n bits requires the creation of a primitive characteristic polynomial. Initially, the components of the characteristic polynomial are chosen at random and then checked whether this characteristic polynomial is primitive. Knowing the loops against reaction in the LFSR, we can construct a square matrix formed by the n columns representing the first n vectors P 0 to The characteristic polynomial is primitive if the generated sequence is maximal. The verification of the primitive of a characteristic polynomial can be calculated easily by performing the companion matrix Mc to the power n, which is given as a result the initial companion matrix because all calculations are made modulo 2 n -1. This elevation occur advantageously in a polynomial of n processes increases the power 2:
Two tricks are used in achieving a cipher of two finite fields. The first trick is to determine the vector whose discrete logarithm is equal to the sum of the discrete logarithms of two vectors (the vectors are known, but not their discrete logarithms). The matrix Mv has the left column a column of n numbers 1. If, instead of the left column, we introduce the vector which has the discrete logarithm j and all subsequent columns, discrete logarithms are also multiplied by j, we obtain the Vandermonde matrix MvJ shifted by a factor j. The vector V(i + j), the discrete logarithm is equal to the sum of the discrete logarithm of the vectors i and j is given by the relation
The second trick is used for the multiplication of the discrete logarithm of the input vector by the exponent K. Denote
Multiplying the polynomial P by the polynomial multiplier K can be written P*K = ((…(( P*k n-1 )*2 + P*k n-2 )*2 + P*k n-3 )*2 + .... + P*k 1 )*2 + P*k 0 . In this last relationship, we have only two discrete logarithms additions or multiplication by 2, which is the same.
By performing two consecutive exponentiations in two different finite fields, we realized the cipher complete. Using the LFSR has a very bad reputation in cryptography.
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In fact, if you stay in one finite field, all relationships are linear and the algorithm has no safety. By cons, performing two exponentiations in two different finite fields, all multiplication functions that combine elements of both are in finite fields nonlinear functions and therefore we return to the nonlinear sets. The Secure Encryption Device (SED for short) algorithm is a special case in the finite fields of conjecture, with the special feature that the two characteristic polynomials are actually trinomials, which facilitates the calculations. To break the SED must perform tests in 2 127 , which is likely infeasible. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128-bit blocks includes, but is not entitled to require brute force in 2 128 for breaking tests. Some authors suggest the number of tests needed for 2 115 breaking.
The appendix has been performed the encryption and decryption of the number 1234567890ABCDEFFEDCBA0987654321 with the key 1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF. The left column is the value of the exponent of the bit of the key. The discrete logarithm of each element of the second column is doubled compared to the element which precedes it. The discrete logarithm of elementss of the third column is the sum of the discrete logarithm which precedes the more discrete logarithm of the plaintext input.
We carried out 500 tests for finding polynomial primitive characteristics of 127-bit at random and we found 29 primitive polynomials. The polynomial must have nonzero the term p 0 and the non-zero number of loops against reaction must be an odd number so that the vector having the discrete logarithm 0 receives a zero digit in the transition from zero of the discrete logarithm to discrete logarithm 1. Therefore the number of primitive characteristic polynomials can be estimated as greater than 2 115 .
Universal test for the randomness of a series of numbers
The robustness of an encryption algorithm is a concept difficult to quantify. However, it is permissible to say that a cryptographic algorithm will be more robust than the randomness of the encrypted blocks will be closer to perfect randomness. Any time, cryptanalysis has always been based on the presence of repetition of the same words, letters or bits do not conform to the statistics. This test is based on the theory of probability distribution of the Poisson distribution. We create one collection of 2 n ciphers after a random seed, each encryption is performed by taking the result of the previous encryption as the clear number and encryption key below. Each encrypted block of 127 bits is used to create 127 slidably n bit numbers, the first number of bit 1 to the bit of rank n, the second number of bit 2 to bit (n + 1), and so the result, the last number of bit 127 to
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bit n-1. By grouping is created 127 collections 2 n n bit numbers, each number being derived from the previous encryption. Is carried out the development of small memories 2 n listed from 0 to 2 n -1. Each creation of a number of n bits, we perform an addition +1 in one small memory corresponding to the number listed. After completing 2 n -1 additions to one collection, we will rank all the small stores according to their content, which content may vary from 0 to about a dozen units. The Poisson distribution is used to calculate the exact values of many small memories containing totals of 0, 1, 2, .. 10 units, which are (2 n -1) / λ * e for 0, (2 n -1) / λ * e * 1! for 1, (2 n -1) / λ * e * 2! for 2, and so on.
In these formulations, the coefficient λ of the Poisson distribution is equal to 1 because the number of small stores is equal to the number of ciphers that form a collection of numbers. For practical reasons, we gave 19 to the number n which is a compromise between the number of small memory size and numbers of n bits.
In a real test, the results do not correspond to the exact values given by the Poisson distribution. The difference between the exact values and the experimental values are compared to the standard deviation which is equal to the square root of the exact values. It then performs the weighted average for the decade of the squared deviations from the exact values and obtain a single value expressed in units sigma σ characterizes the randomness of a collection of 2 n numbers of n bits. Finally the operation is performed 127 times for 127 numbers that appear in blocks of 127 bits for the SED algorithm and calculates the average of 127 results. The average result is independent of the seed used for the creation of 2 n -1 encryptions. For the encryption algorithm SED, the test result is 0.57σ universal sigma. By increasing the number of terms of the characteristic polynomial, it enhances the value of σ. The lowest obtained value was σ = 0.173 with a simulation of the algorithm SED with elements of 19 bits, the characteristic polynomials are not trinomials.
Pseudo-public cryptography key
Strong authentication in the field of computer security, must ensure the following: access control, which can be accessed; confidentiality, which can be found; integrity, which can modify; traceability, which is the author.
Password or biometric verification, are not always sufficient to ensure valid control access to an application. We remedy that state of things by using a digital certificate. Certificates are created by a certification company that verifies the applicant's identity and provides authenticator (or Token). This authenticator operates in conjunction with a public key infrastructure. With RSA techniques, it is possible to create an
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asymmetric encryption algorithm where everyone may decrypt with a public key, but only the holder of the secret key can encrypt combined. It is possible to create an almost infinite RSA encryption algorithms that allow companies to sell one certification RSA certificate valid for a limited time and require the applicant to have to buy one new certificate after the elapsed time.
There was never any question of creating authenticators using symmetric ciphers because for to apply the principle of revocation of keys, it is essential to have an almost infinite number of symmetric algorithms that is not possible with AES. With the conjecture of two finite fields can create an almost infinite number of symmetric ciphers, the prospects of strong security could make a fresh start with the pseudo-public cryptography key.
Key cryptography pseudo-public does not use asymmetric ciphers, by cons, through the use of a trusted third part Trust Authority (TA) infrastructure that ensures the safety of the above four elements that form the authenticator. Each affiliate receives during his affiliation one secret key, one public address and one finite field addressed to him by the Diffie-Hellman protocol, [5] . Alice can ask the TA a particular key and the finite field of Bob. Alice may correspond to Bob in encrypted mode using both finite fields, her and Bob. The message text is the subject of the creation of a footprint block by the hash method of using the two finite fields. In that hashing method, each block of the message is encrypted, the key to encrypt is the block being itself. The result of the first exponentiation is added XOR (exclusive or) to the result of the encryption of the previous block. The first block having no previous block, is adding XOR block made by the 111 ... 111 or any other block defined by convention. The result of the last encryption block is the footprint. The software verifies that Bob received the footprint is accurate. Sending the footprint to the TA, Bob receives a certificate attesting that Alice's message is correct. Bob can send a copy of the certificate to which Charles can ask the TA a new certificate that the certificate footprint received by Bob is correct.
A new design software sending a message with foodprint safe, one could imagine that the actual message is preceded and followed by a short message consisting of two blocks. The first block includes clear coordinates: longitude, latitude and time of creation of the message and the second block gives the encryption of the first block. For fully secure message, the last two ciphers must be made using a secret key shared with the TA and in a physically protected enclosure. With this method, we stipulle where took place the creation of the message and when it. When sending the request to the TA certificate, it verifies the accuracy of encryption time and space coordinates. This procedure is not applied cryptography public key. In fact, the authenticator can only indicate that the key was not revoked. An experimental cryptosystem with TA has been working with the SED algorithm since 1999 at the Free University of Brussels. Internet users can ask the TA an affiliation cryptosystem, keys to correspond with other affiliates and certificates to authenticate messages (see: http://www.ulb.ac.be/di/scsi/classicsys/experim.htm).
Final remarks
The Data Encryption Standard (DES), developed at IBM, uses small data block of the length of 64 bits and key size of 56 bits. These restrictions are unsuitable for large amounts of data. Triple-DES (DES applied three times to each data block) solves the problem of the key length but it implies that Triple-DES, designed as a method of increasing the key size of DES without a new algorithm, is three times slower than the speed of DES (see [3] , [6] for more details).
The DES algorithm was controversial mainly because of its relatively too short key length. Nowadays it is considered to be insecure for many applications and has been superseded by the AES with three block ciphers, AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256, where each of these ciphers has a 128-bit block size, with key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, respectively. The DES was replaced by its update "younger brother" Triple-DES, which was believed to be practically secure, although theoretical attacks could be found in the literature [2] .
The conjecture of two finite fields opens new perspectives for cryptography, especially in security. Key cryptography pseudo-public allows us to give all members a finite field for their exclusive use, which helps to achieve stronger security. Note that all applications are free available to users. In appendix, there is performed the encryption and decryption of the number 1234567890ABCDEFFEDCBA0987654321 with key 1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF. The left column is the value of the exponent of the bit of the key. The discrete logarithm of each element of the second column is doubled compared to the element which precedes it. The discrete logarithm of elementss of the third column is the sum of the discrete logarithm which precedes the more discrete logarithm of the plaintext input. 
